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I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 19801 (CERCLA) imposes liability for cleanup costs where
there has been a release to the environment of a hazardous substance.
Generators, transporters, owners and operators at the time of disposal,
142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. 1986). CERCLA is commonly known as
Superfund.
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and current owners are all potentially liable.2 Liability has been con-
strued by the courts as strict,3 even though Congress rejected an explicit
provision of strict liability. Congress intended that liability would follow
2 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). These four classes
of persons liable under CERCLA are called "covered persons" by the Act but are
termed "potentially responsible persons" or "PRP" in much of the literature. This
Note will refer to these covered persons as simply responsible persons. Generators
and transporters have each handled the hazardous substance at some point. Own-
ers and operators at the time of disposal either handled the disposal or were in
control of the facility when the hazardous substance was disposed. Even though
they may not be negligent or even be a cause of the release of the hazardous
substance to the environment, they are held liable because they benefited from
the disposal of the hazardous substance. "Congress intended that those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and re-
sponsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created." Dedham Water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) rev'd,
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989). The rationale for inclusion of the current owner is not as clear. Presumably,
the current owner somehow also benefited, if only by virtue of a deflated purchase
price. Arguably, current owner liability arises from CERCLA's other goal: "Con-
gress intended that the federal government be immediately given the tools for a
prompt and effective response to the problems of national magnitude resulting
from hazardous waste disposal." Id. at 1081. What better way than to have the
current owners, who are accessible, pay for the cleanup. The two goals are rec-
onciled for the current owner by shifting the burden of proof. The current owner
is presumed liable, but she may establish an affirmative defense that a third
party was solely responsible for the release.
Absent from the list of responsible persons are intervening owners who did
not contribute to the disposal. Like the current owners they did not directly benefit
from the hazardous disposal. Unlike the current owners they are less accessible.
A lien on the cleanup site is not effective against them. Therefore, the logic that
holds current owners may not apply to them. See. Cadillac Fairview/California,
Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (strictly
construing the classes of responsible persons and holding that intervening owners
are not liable). But see United States v. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20698 (D.S.C. 1984) (refusing to grant summary judgment in favor of an
intervening owner). However, in Carolawn the defendant was a chemical company
which transferred title to three employees, leaving a question of a retained own-
ership interest. But cf. infra note 123 for a discussion of how intervening owners
can become liable for not disclosing actual knowledge of a hazardous disposal.
The scope of liability for the above responsible persons is for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan; (C) damages
for injury to... natural resources.. .; and (D) costs of any health assessment
or health effects.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Under (A) the gov-
ernment may order the responsible person to conduct the cleanup. Alternatively,
the government may conduct its own cleanup with moneys from the Superfund
and order the responsible person to reimburse the Superfund. CERCLA § 111,
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1982 & Supp. 1986). Either liability under (A) is called Su-
perfund liability.
3See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio,
1983). See also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Versatile Metals, Inc.
v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Bliss, 667 F.
Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053




from the federal common law of abnormally dangerous instrumentalities. 4
Liability is joint and several5 unless a defendant can prove by a prepon-
derance of evidence that the harm due to the release of the hazardous
substances is divisible.6 Liability is retroactive and has withstood con-
United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1985); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (D.C. Mo. 1984);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.C.N.J. 1983); In re T.P. Long Chem-
ical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. Ohio 1985). But see Dore, The Standard of Civil
Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER 260, 276-77 (1981), for a discussion that Congress did
not intend strict liability because it purposely removed language imposing strict
liability in the final draft of the Act.
S126 CONG. KIEC. 26,788 (1980)(statement of Rep. Jeffords); 126 CONG. REC.
26,782 (1980)(statement of Rep. Gore). See also, Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical
Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20133 (E.D. Pa. 1987). According to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977):
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to lia-
bility for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
-makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
While usually the activity is a "business conducted for profit," the rule is "equally
applicable when there is no pecuniary benefit to the actor." Id. at § 520, comment
d. Therefore, in the context of Superfund, current owners are equally liable with
operators and generators. The harm must be serious and must "take into account
the place where the activity is conducted." Id. at § 52ff, comment g. Thus CERCLA
liability does not arise where a hazardous disposal is contained at the facility.
Liability arises only when there is a "release into the environment ... which
may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health or welfare."
CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Unlike the
negligence standard, which is left to a jury, strict liability is a decision for the
court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, comment 1.
5 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio, 1983).
See also Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987);
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. String-
fellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. South Carolina Re-
cycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986); Idaho v. Bunker Hill
Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484
(D.C. Colo. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F. Supp. 1064 (D.C. Colo.
1985); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (D.C. Ill. 1984);
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (D.C. Pa. 1983).
1 See, e.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. In fact, a defense against
joint and several liability based on divisible harm is very difficult. The government
need only prove that hazardous substances of the same kind as a defendant had
disposed was found in the release. The government need not trace the release to
the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666
(D.N.J. 1989).
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stitutional challenge on its application for acts and party relationships
that predate CERCLA's enactment in 1980.7 Moreover, CERCLA liability
permits no defenses except those found in the Act.8
CERCLA provides an affirmative defense to liability actions where a
third party has solely caused the release of the hazardous substance.,
There are two exclusions to this "third party" defense. The defense is
excluded if the third party who was the sole cause of the release was the
defendant's employee or agent. There is also a contractual relationship
exclusion: The third party's act or omission must not have occurred in
connection with a contractual relationship with the defendant. To take
advantage of this third party affirmative defense, the defendant must
also prove that she exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance and that she took precautions against the third party's fore-
seeable acts. Prior to 1986, no case squarely addressed the issue whether
land contracts were contractual relationships that excluded the avail-
ability of the third party defense.'
Congress attempted to clarify the land contract issue as part of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)."
SARA defined "contractual relationship" and included land contracts,
deeds and other instruments transferring title or possession. However,
SARA further provided that land contracts need not invoke the contrac-
tual relationship exception to the third party defense if the property was
acquired after the disposal of the hazardous substance. The purchaser
could establish that she was innocent of cleanup liability by proving that
she did not know and had no reason to know of the disposal of the haz-
ardous substance. 12 The innocent purchaser must establish that she had
"no reason to know" by proving that she conducted an appropriate inquiry
at the time of acquisition.
13
7 "CERCLA does not create retroactive liability, but imposes a prospective
obligation for the post-enactment environmental consequences of the defendants'
past acts." United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.2d
984,996 (4th Cir. 1984). "[E]ven if CERCLA is understood to operate retroactively,
it nonetheless satisfies the dictates of due process because its liability scheme is
rationally related to a valid legislative purpose." Id. at 997-98. See also United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734-37
(8th Cir. 1986), United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1074-77 (D.
Colo. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1398-99
(D.N.H. 1985); Town of Booton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J.
1985); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898-99 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1114-16 (D. Minn.
1982); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1118 (D. Minn. 1982).
9 CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
"0 See EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235,
34,237 (1989).
11 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986); CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1982), as
amended by SARA (Supp. 1986) (definitions).
12 CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1986).




This Note will focus on two classes of innocent purchasers: first, a
prospective purchaser who hopes to avoid CERCLA liability, and second,
an actual purchaser who, after buying property, discovers a release of a
hazardous substance. The purchaser who discovers a release need not
wait for the government to bring a cleanup action against him for joint
and several liability. CERCLA provides two alternatives. SARA intro-
duced the more viable alternative. The purchaser may initiate a de min-
imis settlement with the government for a minimal contribution.1 4 An
older option under CERCLA is a private action in contribution against
other persons potentially liable for the release.' 5 Liability in the private
action is not strict liability as it is in an action against the government,
rather liability is apportioned equitably. The purchaser may even bring
the contribution action in the form of a declaratory judgement prior to
the claim by the government.' 6
The statutory defense for the innocent purchaser is relevant no matter
which forum the purchaser chooses to reduce his liability. In an action
against the government, the Act provides the elements for the affirmative
defense. In a private action, these same elements become factors for de-
termining an equitable proportion. In the de minimis settlement, the
government evaluates the purchaser's potential affirmative defense be-
fore agreeing to settle. The innocent purchaser defense is part of the third
party defense. Accordingly, this Note will examine judicial interpreta-
tions of both defenses.
SARA intended to clarify the purchaser's liability, but prospective pur-
chasers are still confused over the nature and the extent of inquiry re-
quired. Appropriate inquiry was intended to be "consistent with good
commercial or customary practice."'7 No such practice existed in 1986.
The lending industry has since fostered the practice of conducting an
environmental site assessment conducted in phases and has outlined pro-
cedures for these phases. The lending industry has not, however, ad-
dressed a substantive standard for determining the appropriate phase to
stop inquiry. Nor have the courts determined the substantive basis for
evaluating the purchaser's conduct in following these procedures.
This Note will argue that the substantive basis can be found in SARA.
While CERCLA intended liability to be strict, SARA intended in a limited
way to reintroduce concepts of negligence. SARA introduced reasonable-
ness concepts into its guidance for evaluating appropriate inquiry. Ap-
propriate inquiry should invoke the standard of a reasonable person with
the same requisite knowledge as the purchaser, and involved in the same
type of transaction.
'4 CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (Supp. 1986). See infra Part I.A of
this Note.
1 CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See infra
Part II.C of this Note.
16 "In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate." Id.
,1 CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986). See infra Parts
III.B.2 and IV of this Note.
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II. LITIGATION ALTERNATIVES FOR THE INNOCENT PURCHASER
A. Background - Superfund Liability
CERCLA was enacted in part to provide a rapid response to the na-
tionwide threats posed by the thirty to fifty thousand improperly managed
hazardous waste sites in this country.18 The Act authorizes the President
to respond to a release, which presents an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare. 19 The President has subsequently
delegated this authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 0
CERCLA requires the EPA to formulate a National Contingency Plan.21
Consistent with this plan the EPA is authorized to remove the hazardous
substance and to provide for remedial action for the site. 22 The EPA may
tap a Superfund to pay for the response costs, 23 in which case the gov-
ernment must attempt to recover the response cost and reimburse the
Superfund from responsible persons.24
The government's burden in a response reimbursement action 25 is
merely to establish that (1) the site where the response cost were occurred
- United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(Congress also hoped to "induce voluntary responses to those sites."); 5 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6119-20 (1980).
'9 CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
20 Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981); as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,891 (1983).
2. CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982 & Supp. 1986).22 CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). A removal
means a "cleanup or removal of released hazardous substance from the environ-
ment" that are "necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or to the environment" which may result from a release or
threat of release. A remedial action is long term and "consistent with permanent
remedy." Its purpose is to mitigate the "substantial danger to present or future
public health or welfare or the environment." A response means both a removal
and remedial action and includes enforcement activities. A release "means any
spilling, leaking, pumping, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment" and includes "abandon-
ment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing
any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant." CERCLA § 101(22)-(25),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)-(25) (1982 & Supp. 1986) (definitions); 40 C.F.R. § 300.6
(1988) (definitions).
23 CERCLA § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). In addition
to paying for government response costs, the Superfund is also available to any
person who incurs necessary response costs consistent with the national contin-
gency plan and certified by the EPA. Id. at § 111(a)(2). The Superfund is appro-
priated an annual amount of $212,500,000. Id. at § ill(p)(1). Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, § 6301, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 825 (1990).
24 CERCLA § 104(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
2 United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987). See United




is a "facility,"26 (2) a "release" or a "threatened release"27 of a "hazardous
substance 28 from the site has occurred or is occurring, (3) the release or
threatened release caused the government to incur response costs, and
(4) the defendant falls within one of the classes of responsible persons. 29
Liability is then strict 30 and is joint and several.31 The government is free
to move against any and all responsible persons.3 2 It may settle with some
and move against others for the remaining balance.3 The only defense
is the third party affirmative defense, which includes the innocent pur-
chaser defense. 34 But the innocent purchaser need not wait to defend
against the government. She may settle with the government for a min-
imal contribution or she may reduce her liability in a private contribution
action provided by CERCLA.
B. De Minimis Settlements
SARA introduced a section on settlements, although the EPA has set-
tled with responsible persons from the beginning.35 Indeed, the EPA was
criticized for an alleged propensity to issue sweetheart deals. 36 The new
section provides both for general provisions for government settlements
with responsible persons and for more specific provisions for "de minimis"
26 The definition of "facility" is very inclusive. The Act provides a lengthy list
of places such as buildings, ponds, landfills, moving vehicles, or any area where
a hazardous substance has "come to be located." The only exclusions are consumer
products in consumer use and vessels. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)
(1982 & Supp. 1986). Vessels are excluded because various separate provisions
are unique to vessels.
27 A threat of a release must be "substantial," and both the release and the
threat must present an "imminent and substantial danger to public health or
welfare." CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
28 Hazardous substances are not separately defined in CERCLA but take their
definition by references to most of the other environmental acts. CERCLA does,
however, exclude petroleum and natural gas. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14) (1982 & Supp. 1986); 40 C.F.R. § 300.6 (1988). A provision similar to
CERCLA cleanup liability for oil cleanups can be found in the Clean Water Act.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
29 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See supra note
2.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio,
1983). See supra note 3.
31 See, e.g., Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811. See supra note 5.
32 CERCLA § 107(a). 42 U.S.C. 4 9607(a) (1982 & Suu. 1986).
CERCLA § 113(f)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2)-(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
- CERCLA §§ 101(35), 107(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(b) (1982 & Supp.
1986).
35 CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. 1986).
28 The most notorious deal was a premature waiver of future liability for some
parties to the Seymour Recycling Corporation Superfund cleanup. H.R. REP. No.
253(I), 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 282-83 (1986) (separate and dissenting views by Rep.
Florio and others), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2957-58.
1991]
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settlements.3 7 In addition, the section provides for "mixed funding."38
SARA provides for expedited final settlements with de minimis re-
sponsible persons.3 9 The purpose of this procedure is to provide qualified
landowners with legal repose and to reduce the administrative burden
on the EPA for handling the numerous parties to a response action.40 De
minimis settlements must involve "only a minor portion of the response
costs at the facility concerned.."
4 1
There are two classes of qualified de minimis settlers. Class 'A' settlers
include responsible persons with no valid defenses but whose contribu-
tions to the hazardous release are minimal either in amount or in haz-
ardous effect. 41 Class 'B' settlers include owners who purchased with no
"actual or constructive knowledge that the property was used for the
generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any haz-
ardous substance."4 In addition they may not have conducted or permitted
a hazardous disposal nor contributed to its release.44
Class 'B' settlers are true innocent purchasers. The prohibitions against
permitting a disposal or contributing to a release are comparable to the
third party defense requirements for precautions against third party fore-
seeable acts and for due care." The constructive knowledge provision
seems, if anything, more strict in the settlement provisions. 46 In any event
-7 CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (Supp. 1986).
- Mixed funding is a variant of settlement which allows the EPA to reach
different kinds of settlements with different persons at the same site. CERCLA
§ 122(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (Supp. 1986). Some private parties are "preau-
thorized" to conduct the response action and to bring a claim against the Super-
fund. Some "cash out" in lieu of conducting the response action, while still others
do "mixed work," a combination of preauthorization and cash out. See EPA mixed
Funding Settlement Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 8279, 8279 (1988).
CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (Supp. 1986).
- See EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at
34,235.
41 CERCLA § 122(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (Supp. 1986). The EPA uses a
"rule of thumb" that the de minimis party must have contributed one percent or
less of the response action waste. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp.
666, 672 (D.N.J. 1989).
42 CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A) (Supp. 1986).
S3CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 1986).
-Id.
41 Compare CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii)(Supp. 1986) with CERCLA § 107(b)(3)(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a)-(b) (1982
& Supp. 1986). The prohibition against permitting a disposal in the settlement
provisions and the precaution against third party foreseeable acts in the third
party defense each look to the defendant's ability to exercise control over a third
party. The prohibition against contributing to a release in the settlement pro-
visions and the due care requirement in the third party defense both admonish
the defendant not to exacerbate the release.
Compare CERCLA § 122(g)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 1986) with
CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1986). The constructive
knowledge requirement in the settlement provisions actually is more strict than
it is in the innocent purchaser defense. In the affirmative defense, an innocent
purchaser must not have constructive knowledge of a prior hazardous disposal.
In the settlement provisions she must not have constructive knowledge of any
prior generation, transportation, storage, or treatment, as well as of any hazard-
ous disposal. The difference is more literal than real. If generation, transportation,
storage, or treatment have occurred on the property, disposal has likely occurred
as well. See Leifer, EPA's Innocent Landowner Policy: A Practical Approach to




the EPA, who must agree to the settlement, considers these provisions
to be "substantially the same" as those required for the innocent pur-
chaser affirmative defense.
47
An innocent purchaser with a viable affirmative defense should prefer
to settle. The elements of the defenses are identical. At settlement the
government will evaluate the strength of the purchaser's evidence. If the
innocent purchaser does not make a "thorough and convincing demon-
stration" but nonetheless persuades the government that the purchaser
may prevail at trial, the government may still settle. However, it will
probably demand a minimal cash contribution.48 The innocent purchaser
will likely consent to a minimal cash out in exchange for an early de-
termination and reduced litigation costs.
A de minimis settlement requires some consideration from the innocent
purchaser. The minimum consideration is site access and due care as-
surances.49 The due care assurances are those embodied in CERCLA §
107(b)(3)10 which are defined as the "degree of care which is reasonable
under the circumstances," and "include those steps necessary to protect
the public from a health or environmental threat."'"
In exchange for access and cooperation, the innocent purchaser receives
statutory protection against private action for contribution by other re-
sponsible persons52 and a covenant not to be sued for cost recovery by the
government. 53 The covenant not to be sued is much broader than that
47 EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,237
n.8.
48 Id. at 34,240.
49 Site access to the property and cooperation in the EPA's response activities
must extend to the EPA's response action contractors. Id.
50 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
1t EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,240
n.19.
52 Id. at 34,240; CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1982 & Supp.
1986). See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 677 (D.N.J. 1989)
(holding that a potentially responsible person is barred from a private contribution
action against a party that settles with the government). Accord, In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor: re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019 (D.
Mass. 1989). But see United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27,
1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900) (holding that the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, U.L.A. pocket part 40 (1989), controls the right of contribution).
53EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,240.
The covenant not to sue is not available where it would be "inconsistent with
public interest." CERCLA § 122(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(2) (Supp. 1986). The
covenant not to sue also is not binding on a federal natural resource trustee where
there has been damage to a natural resource. See EPA De Minimus Landowner
Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,240 n.23; CERCLA § 122(j)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
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supplied under normal settlements. The normal settlement provisions
provide for future liability if conditions unknown at the time of settlement
are found later.54 In a de minimis settlement the government will also
demand a reopener clause. If information not known to the government
at the time of settlement later indicates that the innocent purchaser no
longer qualifies for a de minimis settlement, the government may seek
further relief. 5 In addition, liability will be reopened if the innocent
purchaser fails to exercise due care, exacerbates the release or fails to
cooperate with the EPA.56 However, unlike the normal settlement, the
government promises not to reopen merely because the cleanup becomes
more costly than originally expected.
C. Private Actions Under CERCLA
1. Contribution
SARA made clear that CERCLA provides a statutory private right of
contribution by any person against any other person who is liable or
potentially liable for response costs.5 7 Both the right to contribution and
the liability for contribution arise explicitly under CERCLA § 107(a).58
The third party defense and its derivative innocent purchaser defense
arise under CERCLA § 107(b)59 and are defenses to CERCLA § 107(a)
liability. Therefore, the innocent purchaser defense is also a defense
against contribution. However, in most private actions under CERCLA,
the innocent purchaser will not be a defendant but a plaintiff. In either
case, the elements of proof are the same.
CERCLA requires that "in resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate."60 In using its equitable powers
to apportion response costs in a private action for contribution, the court
CERCLA § 122(f)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(6) (Supp. 1986).
15 EPA De Minimus Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at
34,240. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666,672 (D.N.J.
1989). In Rohm & Haas, the government assumed that the settler had contributed
less than one percent of the waste at the site. The reopener in the settlement
agreement allowed for further liability "if information not currently known" later
showed that the settler contributed more than one percent. A second reopener
was triggered if the total costs of remedies exceeded the current estimate of
maximum costs for the known hazard. Contrast this deal with the situation of
the nonsettler. Liability is open ended with respect to the total response costs
due to uncertain remedies and to undiscovered contamination at the site. It is
also open ended with respect to percentage of liability.
16 EPA De Minimus Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at
34,240.
67 CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
56 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
51 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986).




may consider the amount of hazardous substance and its degree of toxicity;
the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage or disposal of the substance; and also the care exercised
with respect to the substances and the cooperation with response efforts.
6 1
These are merely the elements of the third party defense, except that
they hold for both parties to the private action.62 An innocent purchaser
by definition has no involvement with the hazardous substance and is
required to exercise due care. Clearly, an innocent purchaser has a con-
tribution alternative.
Because liability for a government response action is strict, the innocent
purchaser defendant has only an affirmative defense and must prove each
element. On the other hand, in a CERCLA private action liability is
apportioned equitably. Therefore, the innocent purchaser as a plaintiff
merely uses the elements of the affirmative defense as factors to be
weighed against the defendant.63
An innocent purchaser may have to prove all the elements of the af-
firmative defense in the private action in order for the court to grant
complete indemnity. No reported decision appears squarely on point. How-
ever, in Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.,r the city was arguably an
innocent landowner but was not an innocent purchaser. The defendant
allegedly bribed city employees to permit it to dump hazardous waste in
the municipal landfill at night. The court held that the city was not
entitled to indemnity for the cleanup, although it was entitled to contri-
bution. The court reasoned that "Congress intended to hold innocent
landowners liable," but that Congress created one category of potentially
liable persons whom it perceived to be innocent under specified conditions,
that is, those who purchased after the disposal of the hazardous sub-
stance. 65 Innocent landowners whose liability arose from a disposal after
purchase did not qualify as an innocent purchasers.- One can infer from
6" United States v. Franklin P. Tyson General Devices, Inc., No. 84-2663 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 29, 1988) 10-11 (1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 841); United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 n.13 (4th Cir. 1988); H.R. REP. No. 253(111), 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1985) reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3042.
62 The third party defense requires zero involvement in the hazardous release,
but it also requires positive efforts. The defendant must exercise due care toward
the hazardous substance and take precautions against foreseeable acts of those
who are involved in the hazardous release. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
See Chemical Waste Mgt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285,
1291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See, e.g., Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670
F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Okla. 1987). For example, if an innocent purchaser upon
discovering a hazardous release subsequently sells the property without disclosing
such knowledge, she has waived the defense. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(35)(C) (Supp. 1986). However, in the private action that sale without dis-
closure is merely evidence of lack of due care concerning the hazardous substance
and weighed against the purchaser.
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20133 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7058, *6).
Stepan Chemical, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7058 at *7.
1 The court refused to create an additional category of innocent persons, that
is, those who claim a "scope of employment" exception to the contractual rela-
tionship exclusion to the third party defense. Id. at *14.
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this decision that, in order for a court to grant complete indemnity, a
landowner would have to be an innocent purchaser as defined by the Act
and meet all its tests.
An innocent purchaser often will incur preliminary expenses after the
discovery of a hazardous release and prior to a government cleanup. These
expenses are ripe for recovery against other responsible persons in a
private action even before a government response action has established
the liable parties.6
7
In Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,68 the former owner left slag on
the property. The state ordered the present owner to test the slag. The
court found that the present owner's action to recover the testing costs
from the former owner was ripe even though the federal government had
not yet ordered a Superfund cleanup program. In Cadillac Fairview/Cal-
ifornia v. Dow Chemical,69 the current owner learned after purchase that
the former owner had dumped hazardous industrial by-products. The
owner conducted tests on his own and found a hazardous release. The
state then ordered the current owner to erect a fence and post security.
Unlike Wickland, there was neither a state nor federal cleanup program
in effect, yet the owner's claim for recovery of the cost of the fence and
security was ripe against the former owner.
2. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
A contribution cause of action for Superfund liability is also ripe for
declaratory relief prior to a government response action as long as the
essential facts establishing the right to declaratory relief have already
occurred.70 Of course, an award of declaratory judgment merely declares
that between the parties to the private action, the defendant is liable for
cleanup cost.7' The plaintiff in the private action may still be liable as a
defendant in the government response action, barring an affirmative de-
fense. A contribution award is of no value against an insolvent defendant.
The resolution of future liability is not the innocent purchaser's only
concern. He may want to regain use of alienability of his property without
waiting for a government cleanup which may or may not be forthcoming.
Unfortunately for the innocent purchaser, CERCLA provides no right for
67The expenses, however, must be necessary expenses and must be consistent
with the National Contingency Plan. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986). In order to establish a claim for cost recovery
against a responsible party, the innocent party must show (1) that the defendant
is a covered person responsible for response costs under Section 107(a)(1)-(4), (2)
that there was a release or threat of release of hazardous substances from the
site, (3) that the release or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur costs,(4) that the costs were necessary for the response, and (5) that the response action
was consistent with the National Contingency Plan. See, e.g., General Electric
Co. v. Litton Business Systems, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 955 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
- 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988).
70 792 F.2d at 893.




a private person to enjoin other responsible persons to conduct a cleanup.72
CERCLA does authorize the Attorney General to seek an injunction
against a responsible person to force a cleanup "when the President de-
termines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment
to the public health or welfare or the environment."'73 Private injunctive
relief would render the express grant to the government redundant and
enable private parties to bypass the specific limitations on the government
to seek similar injunctions.7 4
An innocent purchaser may of course clean up her own site and seek
reimbursement from the Superfund. However, such a recovery requires
that the costs be approved and certified by the government.7 5 The gov-
ernment is unlikely to approve any expenditures by the Superfund when
an alternative exists. The innocent purchaser may also attempt to recover
these costs from other responsible persons, provided the costs are "nec-
essary costs of response" and are "consistent with the national contin-
gency plan.."
76
3. Defenses Against Private Action
The doctrine of unclean hands does not apply to CERCLA private ac-
tions.77 CERCLA's fundamental purpose is "to provide for the expeditious
and efficacious clean-up of hazardous waste sites." Congress intended that
the responsible persons would be liable for the costs of these clean-ups,
and one "incentive for doing so was availability of a private cause of
action. '78 Application of the clean hands doctrine would discourage quick
cleanups. If a responsible person might lose his right of contribution
against other responsible persons because of legal indiscretions, he would
be less likely to actively participate in early response actions. No such
considerations are relevant when the government has already conducted
a response action and is seeking recovery. The government can, and sta-
tutorily must, require that the defendant be truly innocent to escape
liability.
72 840 F.2d at 696-97.
11 CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
7, 840 F.2d at 697.
15 CERCLA § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
71 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Not
all cleanup costs are recoverable, however, such preliminary costs as a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) are recoverable in a private action. CER-
CLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986); Amland Properties
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 711 F. Supp. 784, 798 (D.N.J. 1989). Removal
costs are also likely to be recovered if the innocent purchaser complies with the
relatively simple requirements of the National Contingency Plan. Amland, 711
F. Supp. at 795; 40 C.F.R. § 300.65. Remedial costs are harder to recover because
they require compliance with detailed procedural and substantive provisions.
Amland, 711 F. Supp. at 795; 40 C.F.R. § 300.68.
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Private action rights under CERCLA may be affected by terms of con-
tractual relationships between the parties. CERCLA allows parties to
freely contract so as to indemnify or hold harmless one of the parties,
although such agreements are not binding on the government in a re-
sponse action.79 Such an indemnity action is governed by state contract
law8 0 and not by federal equitable apportionment under CERCLA's con-
tribution provision."'
In Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah,82 a seller treated a water tower with chro-
mium. The buyer agreed to assume responsibility for the cleanup in con-
sideration for a reduction in price and thereby lost his CERCLA right to
contribution. The buyer in Ecodyne was aware of the hazard and was
therefore not an innocent purchaser. However, a similar contract exclu-
sion could also estop an innocent purchaser. A purchaser conducts an
appropriate inquiry and honestly, but mistakenly, believes that there was
no hazardous disposal at the site. As a result, she indemnifies the seller
from any future cleanups as part of the contract bargain. According to
Ecodyne, she has waived her CERCLA right to contribution.
On the other hand, "as is" contracts are not sufficient to transfer CER-
CLA liability to an innocent purchaser. Such a provision is "merely a
warranty disclaimer and as such precludes only claims based on war-
ranty."8 3 In Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,84 as in Ecodyne, the
buyer was not an innocent purchaser. The property was already under a
court order at the time of sale to halt the release. Yet the buyer under
an "as is" sales contract was entitled to contribution. If an "as is" contract
provision does not preclude contribution for a knowing purchaser, the
provision certainly cannot preclude contribution for an innocent pur-
chaser.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE INNOCENT PURCHASER DEFENSE
A. The Third Party Affirmative Defense
1. Source and Structure
CERCLA, from its inception, listed four classes of covered persons who
are potentially liable for response cost and other damages: (1) current
facility owners and operators, (2) owners and operators at the time of the
disposal of any hazardous substances, (3) generators of found hazardous
71 CERCLA § 107(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
82 718 F. Supp. 1454 (N.D. Cal. 1989).





substances, and (4) transporters.8 5 Liability is strict.86 The only defenses
are affirmative defenses that establish that the release or threat of release
which led to the response cost were caused solely by acts of God, war or
a third party.8 7 The defense is excluded if the third party was the de-
fendant's employee or agent. It is also excluded if the third party's acts
or omissions occurred in connection with a contractual relationship with
the defendant.18
The third party defense on its face requires a two phase analysis.8 9
Theoretically, a defendant could prevail by proving the nonexistence of
a contractual relationship with someone who was the sole cause of the
release. Arguably, even if a contractual relationship exists, the defendant
could still prevail if the third party's acts or omissions did not occur in
connection with that contractual relationship. Therefore, the defendant
must prove a lack of contractual control over the third party. 0 However,
early cases addressing this issue looked merely toward the existence of
a contractual relationship and thus broadened the contractual relation-
ship exclusion sufficiently to swallow the defense.9'
The third party defense seemed virtually eliminated for an innocent
landowner. Land titles were certainly contractual relationships and
seemed to provide the decisive link between current owners and owners
or operators at the time of disposal. Prior to SARA, the EPA took such
a position.02 However, no court squarely addressed the issue.923 The avail-
ability of the third party defense to an innocent landowner was still in
doubt.
SARA resolved the issue of the innocent landowner by defining "con-
tractual relationship" in favor of permitting the defense for the innocent
purchaser only.9 4 SARA's specific provisions will be analyzed later. For
L CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See supra note
2.
" See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.
Ohio, 1983); see supra note 3.
87 CERCLA § 107(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
8 CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).89 Ruhl, The Third-Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowing the
Contractual Relationship Exception, 29 SOUTH TEXAS L. REV. 291, 296 (1988).
10 Id. at 310.
11Id. at 295-96, 303. See, e.g., United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D.S.C. 1984), modified, United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3156 (1989).92 EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,236.
13 Id. at 34,237.
94 CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1986). The definition
of "contractual relationship" chosen by Congress derives the third party defense
to an innocent landowner who was the owner at the time of disposal of a hazardous
substance by a third party.
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now it is important to observe that the innocent purchaser is a clarifi-
cation within the third party defense and not a separate defense 9 5 The
following discussion examines the third party defense provisions that
have been part of CERCLA from the beginning.9 6
2. Sole Cause Requirement
The requisite first step in the third party defense is to prove that some
third party who is not in a contractual relationship with the defendant
is the sole cause of the release or threat of release. 97 For example, in
O'Neil v. Picillo98 generators of hazardous waste claimed that a licensed
transporter was responsible for the hazardous disposal that caused the
release at the disposal site. The generators consigned their waste to the
transporter, and the transporter decided where the waste would go. The
court rejected this defense because the third party had to be a totally
unrelated third party.99
The sole cause element can turn on the distinction between a release
and a disposal of the hazardous substance. A response action is triggered
"whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released into the environment
or there is a substantial threat of such a release, or (B) there is a release
or threat of a release of a contaminant which may present an imminent
and substantial danger to public health or welfare." 100 A release requires
a spill or a leak into the environment.10' Thus, a contained placement or
disposal does not constitute a release. 10 2 While a person becomes poten-
9 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 186 (1986).
The third party defense requires a defendant to prove a third party solely
caused the release or threat of release. The third party's acts or omissions must
not have occurred in "connection with a contractual relationship ... with the
defendant." In addition, the defendant must prove that she (a) "exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned" and that she (b) "took pre-
cautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could forseeably result from such acts or omissions." CERCLA
§ 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
Id.
682 F. Supp. 706, 727-28 (D.R.I. 1988), afId, 883 F.2d 176 (1st 1989), cert.
denied, American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 110 S.Ct. 1115 (1990). Picillo involved
a generator and not a landowner. However, the elements of the third party defense
are the same no matter how the defendant became potentially liable. Therefore,
throughout the section on the third party defense, this Note will examine the
case law dealing with various types of responsible persons.
Id. at 728.
100 CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
10 CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The list of
processes causing a release also includes "pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, [and] disposing."
102 However, abandonment of barrels containing a hazardous substance con-




tially liable merely for a disposal of a hazardous substance which is later
released, the third party defense requires that some third party was solely
responsible for the release or threat of release."0 3
Proving that a third party solely caused the release may in theory be
as simple as differentiating the defendant's wastes from those substances
that are the subject of release. But the proof is not simple and the de-
fendant has the burden of proof in an affirmative defense. In Washington
v. Time Oil Co.,104 an alleged innocent purchaser was an oil company who
after purchase deposited filter cakes containing hazardous substances on
the property. The purchaser claimed that the property was contaminated
at the time of purchase and that the hazardous substances that he released
did not include the filter cakes. The court noted that it was the defendant's
burden, not the government's, to trace the release to one defendant or
another.10 5
The sole cause of release is an issue of material fact. In United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp.,106 two shareholders managed the corporate facility
while in bankruptcy. A third party creditor 0 7 foreclosed on the inventory
and equipment but not on the property. In the process of an auction of
the inventory and the equipment, the creditor allegedly disturbed asbes-
tos wrappings on the pipes and thereby solely caused the release of the
asbestos. The government moved for summary judgement against the two
103 CERCLA § 107(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The
threat of release must be a "substantial threat of release into the environment
of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare." CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See supra note 23.
104 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
5 Id. at 532.
106 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd on othergrounds, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3481 (1991).
107 Creditors are not included in the classes of responsible persons. CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The term owner or operator
"does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the vessel or facility." CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
(Supp. 1986). Creditors can, however, become liable under CERCLA if they ac-
tively participate in the management of the property during or after foreclosure.
See Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (port
authority bond holder during bankruptcy proceedings not liable unless at a min-
imum it participated in the actual management of the facility); United States v.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (bank liable
for becoming involved with the day-to-day management of the facility while
creditor was in bankruptcy proceedings); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (bank liable for holding onto property for two
years from time of foreclosure until subsequent sale). But see United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990) ("secured creditor will
be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is sufficiently
broad to support the inference that it could (emphasis added) affect hazardous
waste disposal decisions if it so chose"; Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand
Lenders' Risks Under Superfund, NATL L.J. 18 (Sep. 17, 1990). See generally,
Mays, Secured Creditors and Superfund: Avoiding the Liability Net, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 609 (Jul. 28, 1989).
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shareholders as current owners. 10 8 The court denied the motion. The
shareholders were entitled to establish the third party defense at trial
by proving that the creditors solely caused the asbestos release. 0 9
3. Due Care Requirement
In addition to proving that a third party solely caused the release, a
landowner who is a responsible person must prove that she "exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of
all relevant facts."110 If a landowner acts so as to exacerbate the harm
after a release has occurred, she has lost the third party defense for lack
of due care. For example, she may fail to shield the area from the public.
If the landowner actually contributed to the release by some act, she
would be denied the defense for lack of a third party who was solely
responsible.
A defendant may breach the due care requirement by a failure to act.
In United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.,"' a responsible party, the State
of Utah, owned a right of way on which the legal owner's predecessor in
interest allegedly left hazardous tailings. Utah did nothing except to ask
the legal owner to correct the problem. Utah was denied summary judge-
ment on its cross-claim for indemnity against the legal owner because it
had violated due care as required for the third party defense.
4. Precaution Against Third Party Foreseeable Acts
In addition to a requirement of due care, the third party defense re-
quires that the responsible person take "precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions. 11 2 The due care require-
108 Corporate officers and employees may be personally held liable for Super-
fund liability. Neither appears explicitly in the definition of "person" but neither
are they excluded. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. 1986).
Congress could have limited the statutory definition of "person" but chose
not to do so .... Moreover, construction of CERCLA to impose liability upon
only the corporation and not the individual corporate officers and employees
who are responsible for making corporate decisions about handling and
disposal of hazardous substances would open an enormous, and clearly un-
intended, loophole in the statutory scheme.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
743 (8th Cir. 1986). The shareholders in Fleet Factors are potentially liable be-
cause they acted as corporate officers during bankruptcy proceedings of the cor-
poration.
"9 Fleet Factors, 724 Supp. at 962.
110 CERCLA § 107(b)(3)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3)(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
"I No. 86-C-0924J (D. Utah Jul. 13, 1988) (1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11,975).




ment controls the landowner's conduct after a release, while the foresee-
able act requirement controls acts or omissions that might have prevented
the third party from causing the release in the first place. Where the
third party's sole-cause act was vandalism, 113 a landowner would have to
prove that she took proper precautions such as fences or security." 4 Sim-
ilar precautions might be required against "midnight dumping.""'
Holdings in this area sometimes stress the failure of the landowner to
exercise contractual control over the third party. At this stage of the
analysis the defendant has already proved the primary elements of the
defense. A third party has caused the hazardous release and the third
party's acts or omissions that caused the release were not called for di-
rectly or indirectly by a contract between the third party and the de-
fendant. Nonetheless, a contract exists between the defendant and the
third party.
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,"1 ' Shore knew that the tenant on
the property it had just purchased for future real estate development
would continue to dump hazardous waste from the time of closing until
Shore evicted the tenant. Shore was, therefore, denied a third party de-
fense because it did not take precautions against these foreseeable acts."17
In United States v. Monsanto Co.,"" the defendant landowners were
absentee landlords to a recycling company. However, they never inspected
the site during the lease. Therefore, they were unable to present any
evidence that they took precautionary action against the recycling com-
pany's foreseeable acts that caused the release." 9 Similarly, in Washing-
ton v. Time Oil Corp.,12 a landlord oil company failed to exercise sufficient
control over a "sloppy" oil refinery subleasee to qualify for the third party
defense.
113 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986), approving the
use of the third party defense where the release was caused by an act of vandalism,
providing the landowner took satisfactory precautions against foreseeable acts of
vandalism. Vandalism is a classic illustration of a third party defense situation.
The vandal solely causes the release. The vandalism is not part of the contract
with the landowner. But the landowner may still be liable. If the vandalism was
foreseeable, the landowner must take reasonable precautions.
114 See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chemical Co., 840 F.2d 691
(9th Cir. 1988), where the state actually ordered the landowner to erect the fence
and post security. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
115 Cf. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20133 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7058, *11), see supra note 64 and
accompanying text. The city did not meet the sole cause requirement of the third
party defense. Its own employees at the landfill were a cause of the release because
they received a bribe from the midnight dumpers. However, the court could just
as well have held that the city did not properly screen or monitor its employees
to prevent foreseeable bribery attempts from midnight dumpers.
11 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
17 Id. at 1049. See Ruhl, The Third-Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability:
Narrowing the Contractual Relationship Exception, 29 SOUTH TEXAS L. REV. 291,
303 (1988).
"s 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (same case as United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), supra note 91).
119 Id. at 169.
120 687 F. Supp. 529, 533 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
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5. The Contractual Relationship Exclusion for Landowners
CERCLA excludes the third party defense if the act or omission of the
third party which caused the release occurred in connection with a con-
tractual relationship between the third party and the defendant.' 2 1 Prior
to SARA, no court had addressed the issue as to whether land contracts
and similar transactions transferring title or use were the type of con-
tracts that excluded the third party defense. SARA clarified the issue for
the innocent purchaser, who is entitled to a third party defense. 122
B. The Innocent Purchaser Defense
1. Source and Structure
With SARA in 1986, Congress clarified what is commonly called the
"innocent landowner" defense. The statutory defense applies to three
classes of landowners who acquired real property after a hazardous dis-
posal: Those who acquire by inheritance or bequest, any government
entity that acquires property involuntarily, and the innocent purchaser. 123
SARA did not create a new defense for the innocent purchaser. The
amendment was intended to "clarify and confirm" the third party de-
fense. 24 The defense appears in the definition section as a means of de-
121 CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
112 The innocent seller is not entitled to a third party defense. See United States
v. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)
(decided after SARA but using pre-SARA law); EPA De Minimis Landowner
Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,237 n.4. Defendant Occidental Chem-
ical in Hooker operated a chemical waste disposal site at Love Canal. It claimed
that it safely and lawfully enclosed the waste. No hazardous release occurred
while it owned the site. Subsequent owners and developers ruptured the enclosure
and released the dioxin, 680 F. Supp. at 552. Occidental claimed that the devel-
opers were the sole cause of the release and that it was entitled to a third party
defense. The court denied Occidental's third party defense. Occidental's sale to
the developers was a contractual relation which excluded the defense. "Congress
did not intend to extend the [third party] defense to the original disposers," who
"are able to control the acts of these subsequent purchaser." 680 F. Supp. at 552.
A similar result could have been reached without automatically denying the
defense to land sellers. Occidental could, nevertheless, be denied use of the defense
for not taking precautions in the sales\contract to prevent the developers from
releasing the hazardous substance.
12 CERCLA § 101(35)(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(a) (Supp. 1986). The defense
applies to current owners. Landowners who acquired after a hazardous disposal
but no longer own the property generally do not need the defense. They are not
in the class of the covered persons potentially liable for response costs, CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. 1986). See supra note 2. They are, however,
liable if they had actual knowledge of a release or a threat of a release of a
hazardous material and subsequently transferred the property without disclosing
such knowledge. CERCLA § 101(35)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(c) (Supp. 1986).




fining the contractual relationship exclusion to the third party defense. 125
It allows that "land contracts, deeds and other instruments transferring
title or possession" are contractual relationships for purposes of excluding
the third party affirmative defense. The third party defense can be used
where the contractual relationship exclusion does not apply. The exclu-
sion does not apply where the defendant acquired the real property "after
the disposal or placement of the hazardous substances on, in, or at the
facility," provided at the time of the acquisition, the defendant "did not
know and had no reason to know" of the disposal. 126
The amendment elaborates on what the innocent purchaser must es-
tablish in order to prove that she had "no reason to know." She must
prove that at the time of acquisition, she made "all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and use of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. 127
Moreover, the amendment list factors that the court shall take into ac-
count to adjudge appropriate inquiry.1 2
2. Appropriate Inquiry into Previous Ownership and Use
Actual knowledge at the time of acquisition of a prior disposal on the
purchased property precludes the innocent purchaser defense. In Wick-
land Oil Terminals v. Asarco,129 the buyer was aware of large slag piles
and knew they contained lead when the property was purchased. In
United States v. Tyson,130 the buyer knew that the former owner hauled
industrial waste to the site. As a result of their knowledge, both were
denied the defense.
- CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. 1986).
126 CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1986).
127 CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986).
128 Id., infra note 171 & accompanying text. An otherwise innocent purchaser
who after purchase obtains actual knowledge of a hazardous release or threat of
release and subsequently transfers the property without disclosing such knowl-
edge loses the benefit of the innocent purchaser defense. CERCLA § 101(35)(C),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (Supp. 1986). The purchaser's burden in establishing the
defense is to prove lack of constructive knowledge at the time of the property
acquisition of a hazardous disposal. Apparently, the purchaser may learn of the
disposal after moving in but as long as she has no actual knowledge of a release
or threat of a release, she may subsequently transfer the property without dis-
closure. On the other hand "transferring property with disclosure [of a disposal]
does not provide a person with a defense, if such person is otherwise liable." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 188 (1986).
Note that several states require the seller to give notice to a buyer of any
known prior disposal of a hazardous substance. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21C,
§ 7 (1989).
129 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20855 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (1988 WESTLAW
167247).
11o 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20527, 25 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1897
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
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Where actual knowledge of a prior disposal is absent, SARA directs
the courts to look to good commercial or customary practice in order to
determine an appropriate inquiry into previous ownership and use.131
However, the ambiguity in the appropriate inquiry requirement "has had
the real estate and environmental communities in a state of confusion
since 1986 ... ",132 The problem is the lack of any standard for what is
good commercial or customary practice. 13 3 Moreover, Congress did not
intend a single fixed standard. Congress intended that the duty to inquire
should be judged by the standard at the time of acquisition and that the
standard should increase as public awareness of hazardous releases
grows. 134 Good commercial practice means that "reasonable inquiry must
have been made in all circumstances, in light of best business and land
transfer principles."1 But business principles vary with the type of trans-
action. The standard for commercial transactions should, therefore, be
higher than for private residential transactions. 136
Good commercial or customary practice is time dependent. If the pur-
chase was made far enough in the past, custom at that time may not have
required even a visual inspection. For example, in United States v. Ser-
afini, 37 a developer purchased land in 1969 that was obviously and visibly
contaminated with hundreds of abandoned drums, and he did so without
a site visit. Yet the court refused to rule that as a matter of law that good
commercial practice among real estate developers called for a visual in-
spection of the property prior to purchase. Because the standard of inquiry
should increase as public awareness of hazardous releases increases, 38 a
commercial purchase without a visual inspection today would surely con-
stitute an insufficient inquiry as a matter of law.
13 CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (Supp. 1986). The knowl-
edge requirement arguably does not apply to an involuntary acquisition by a
government entity or to an acquisition by inheritance or bequest, which defenses
appear in subsections (ii) and (iii) respectively. Section (35)(A) requires that an
innocent landowner need establish only "one or more of the circumstances" of the
three subsections. However, the Joint Conference Committee Report expresses
the opinion that those who acquire by inheritance or bequest "without actual
knowledge" must "engage in a reasonable inquiry but they need not be held to
the same standard as those who acquire property as part of a commercial or
private transaction." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986).
See also EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at
34,239.
132 135 CONG. REC. E2367 (extension of remarks by Rep. Weldon, R-Pa., Jun.
28, 1989).
133/d.
134 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986).
135 Id.
136 Id. Those who acquire through inheritance or bequest without actual knowl-
edge should have the lowest standard and need only engage in a reasonable
inquiry. See also supra note 131.
"137 706 F. Supp. 354 (M.D. Pa. 1989). But see EPA De Minimis Landowner
Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10, at 34,238 n.ll, criticizing the opinion in
Serafini, claiming "the criteria set forth ... seem[s], at a minimum, to contemplate




The standard for appropriate inquiry also depends on the parties in-
volved and requires an examination of any requisite knowledge that the
buyer has or should have. In Jersey City Redevelopment Authority v. PPG
Industries,'13 9 a landfill contractor in 1964 purchased property for a land-
fill. The contractor knew at the time of purchase that the land contained
chromium but claimed lack of knowledge that chromium was hazardous.
The contractor became liable for contribution by transporting chromium
bearing fill to plaintiffs property where the chromium subsequently was
released. The court held that a triable issue existed as to whether the
contractor had the requisite lack of knowledge to establish the innocent
purchaser defense.1 40 What is interesting about the court's holding in this
case is that someone in the landfill business was not held liable as a
matter of law for knowing that known constituents of soil were hazardous.
It is likely, although the court does not say so, the decision may have
hinged on the early purchase date of 1964.
No reported decision has yet to address the appropriate inquiry issue
for a purchase that has occurred since SARA announced the requirement.
The only reported decision thus far that has accepted the innocent land-
owner defense as a matter of law involved a 1982 transaction. Moreover,
the defendants were not purchasers for consideration but were gift re-
cipients.
In United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur Depot,14 ' a family corporation
operated a metal recycling scrap yard. The corporation deposited PCB
transformers in a gravel pit at the yard before 1973. In 1979 Pacific Hide
bought the main part of the property but not the gravel pit. In 1981 one
brother of the corporation died and devised his shares to his wife. In 1982
another brother transferred all of his interest to his three children, just
four months before the EPA found the PCP capacitors leaking in the
gravel pit. When the corporation dissolved shortly afterwards, the prop-
erty of the corporation including the gravel pit was transferred to the
wife and the three children in exchange for their stock.
Because the defendants obtained their interests by gift and by corporate
events beyond their control, the court held that they were entitled to the
innocent landowner defense as a matter of law even though they had
made no inquiry.142 The court reasoned that Congress did not lay down
a "bright line rule" requiring inquiry in every case.14 None of the de-
fendants had any special knowledge and Congress intended to treat in-
heritance and bequest leniently.14 The court did not hold, however, that
inquiry would never be required for a gift recipient. 145
139 655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987).
140 Id. at 1262.
'4 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989).
141 Id. at 1348.
143 Id. at 1349.
I Id. at 1348; see supra note 131.
14, The decision in Pacific Hide may very well be equitable but the fact pattern
suggests a potential for abuse and a frustration of a main goal of CERCLA. The
owner who transferred all his interest to his children just prior to the discovery
1991]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
IV. PRE-ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS
A. Current Status of Commercial Practice
The previous sections dealt mainly with the problem of a person who
purchased real property innocent of a prior hazardous disposal on the
property, later finds a release of the hazardous substances, and now faces
Superfund liability. This Note now turns to prospective purchasers and
how they may avoid Superfund liability. SARA requires that purchasers
conduct, at the time of acquisition, appropriate inquiry into previous
ownership and use. This procedure for appropriate inquiry is called an
"environmental site assessment" which is also known as a "pre-acquisi-
tion site assessment.' 46
As previously noted, the courts have yet to shed much light on the
meaning of the "all appropriate inquiry" requirement for the innocent
purchaser defense. Little is known beyond what is in the statute itself or
expressed by the legislative history:' 47 The standard increases in time as
public awareness increases, and more sophisticated transactions require
higher standards. The implications for current and future real estate
transactions are disturbing. The real estate community is in a state of
confusion.' 48 Commercially viable properties are lying useless for fear of
Superfund liability. 49 Lenders, fearing that they may be become "deep
pockets," shun small business real estate acquisitions.'50
The problem is that the statutorial standard for "all appropriate in-
quiry" is "good commercial or customary practice,"' but commercial prac-
tice has yet to be standardized. 152 Custom is what the community "finds
of a release is still potentially liable as an owner at the time of disposal. Id. at
1349. However, he may have transferred to his children all the means by which
the government may execute on a judgment for recovery of response costs. Thus
a main goal of reimbursing the Superfund could be frustrated while the children
as innocent landowners could have the benefit of a cleanup at government expense.
Ironically, if an outsider had purchased the same property from the owner, that
purchaser would be held to a higher standard of inquiry merely because she paid
consideration for the property. A more equitable approach would hold recipients
by inheritance or bequest to the same standard as held to purchasers, but limit
the liability of the gift recipients to their interest in the property.
'" See Engineering Group Develops First U.S. Guide for Environmental Site
Assessment, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 336 (Sept. 11, 1989) (LEXIS, Nexis library,
BNA file).
147 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-88 (1986).
141 See 135 CONG. REC. E2367 (extension of remarks by Rep. Weldon, R-Pa.,
Jun. 28, 1989).
149 See Small Businesses, Lenders Suffocating under CERCLA Liability, Wit-
nesses Say, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 654 (Aug. 11, 1989), discussing Rep. LaFalce's
(D-N.Y.) bill to protect businesses and banks from Superfund liability, H.R. 101-
150 Id.
-' CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986).
152 See Bennett, Environmental Due Diligence: An Evolving National Standard,





to be an acceptable course of action."'53 "However, a particular course of
conduct, even if followed by an entire industry, can still be found negligent
if it cannot withstand the test of reasonable behavior and ordinarily
prudent judgement."1 4 Therefore, it is not enough that real estate inter-
ests develop procedures. Courts must find these procedures to be reason-
ably acceptable. Until they do, confusion is likely to remain.
B. Procedural Guidelines
The EPA's long-waited Guidance on Landowner Liability 5 5 merely out-
lined de minimis settlements but failed to provide guidance on appro-
priate inquiry. 156 In the breach, the lending industry has begun to develop
procedures for pre-acquisition environmental assessments which are in-
tended to be included as part of loan closings. A full site assessment
includes extensive soil sampling. It can cost ten's of thousands of dollars
157
and is impractical for small properties, especially residential properties.
Moreover, a full assessment causes significant delays. 15 These problems
are addressed by a phased approach which is now becoming standard in
the lending industry. 59
Fannie Mae guidelines'6 to the lending industry for multi-family prop-
erty loan applications call for a two phase assessment. Phase I "focuses
on a review of readily ascertainable information about the property in-
cluding a review of government environmental records and interviews
with people knowledgeable about the property," followed by a property
inspection by qualified persons. Phase II involves soil sampling, but is
only done if a need is indicated by Phase .161
For many small residential property acquisitions, even a Phase I as-
sessment can be prohibitively expensive especially when conducted by
environmental consultants, who are presently in great demand. 8 2 One
environmental consultant suggested that Phase I be split. Phase I(a)
would include a review of government environmental records, a forty-
year title search and a borrower questionnaire, all for about $500. Phase
I(b), if needed, would include an on-site inspection by a knowledgeable
"I Id. at LEXIS BNA file *18. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, 193-96 (5th ed. 1984).
Bennett, 52 Banking Rep. at LEXIS BNA file *19.
"' EPA De Minimis Landowner Settlement Guidelines, supra note 10.
156 See 135 CONG. REc. E2367 (extension of remarks by Rep. Weldon, R-Pa.
Jun. 28, 1989).
" Real Estate Transactions More Complicated as Lawyers, Consultants Tangle
with Waste, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 198 (Jun. 2, 1989).
16 Id.
119 See Bennett, 52 Banking Rep. at LEXIS BNA file *14.
1 Environmental Risk Management Procedures, a.k.a. DUS Environmental
Guidelines, (Fannie Mae, Aug. 1, 1988).
"I Bennett, 52 Banking Rep. at LEXIS BNA file *15.
162 Id.
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person of readily ascertainable information. More importantly, the whole
Phase I could be conducted by a trained loan officer.'63
It should be kept in mind that the lending industry developed these
assessment guidelines for the benefit of lenders, not for the benefit of
purchasers. The guidelines do not tell a buyer whether or not to purchase,
but rather tell a lender whether or not to grant a loan. The risk for the
lender is much less because those who hold property primarily to protect
security interests are not held liable as owners under CERCLA.'6 The
lender's primary concern is the loss of their security interest if Superfund
liability causes the mortgagor to default.165 Liability for the purchaser
extends not just to the property but to her personal assets as well. There-
fore, a purchaser should seek a more detailed assessment in order to make
an informed decision. In order to keep cost down, however, the assessment
should be multi-phased.
One environmental consultant suggested a three phase assessment for
purchasers, beginning with a pre-Phase I initial scoping step. 66 The as-
sessment process would start with a one-day site visit. The inspector
would observe general conditions, collect readily available information
and interview personnel. Phase I would include a title search and a review
of all pertinent records. It could also include a review of any available
historical aerial photographs. This information would then be used to
plan a reconnaissance visit to observe all suspicious conditions observable
on the surface. Phase I would be used to plan for Phase II, which if needed,
consists of sampling air, soil, surface water or ground water. If Phase II
revealed significant contamination, Phase III would require additional
testing but with the goal of determininating the scope of recommended
remedial action required at the site, and the probability of a release of
those contaminants. These guidelines are procedural, but engineering
guidelines are also needed for the actual sampling. 16 7
None of the procedural guidelines suggested guarantees freedom from
Superfund liability. Courts must first accept these procedures and develop
their standards for review of a purchaser's use of the procedures. This
Note will recommend how the court may proceed in the next section.
V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary
In 1980 CERCLA, as finally approved, was hurriedly put together in
the Senate and considered and passed in the House with limited debate.16
113 Id. at LEXIS BNA file *17.164 CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982 and Supp. 1986).
But see supra note 107.
'
6 6Burby, An Overview of Methods for Conducting Property Transaction Site
Assessments, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1451 (Dec. 29, 1989).
167 See, e.g., Engineering Group Develops First U.S. Guide for Environmental
Site Assessment, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 336 (Sep. 11, 1989).
1- Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,





Its language was "circuitous" and its legislative history "sparse and un-
reliable."'6 9 SARA of 1986 was mainly an oversight bill. 170 It gave the
Superfund more realistic funds to enact cleanups and it added new pro-
visions, strengthened others and supposedly clarified still others. The
innocent purchaser defense was not intended to be a new provision, but
rather a clarification of the third party defense as it pertains to one class
of defendants. However, its requirement for an appropriate inquiry prior
to acquisition rested on nonexistent customary and commercial practices.
The provision itself raised public awareness and rendered the defense
even more difficult to establish. Following SARA, the real estate com-
munity was just as confused and even more fearful. The community knows
it has a pre-purchase duty to make an appropriate inquiry. However, it
does not know what an appropriate inquiry entails.
B. How the Law of Appropriate Inquiry Should Develop
The crux of the innocent purchaser defense is appropriate inquiry prior
to purchase, and the talisman of appropriate inquiry is good commercial
and customary practice. In the previous section we examined the proce-
dural steps that the lending and real estate industries are developing to
establish a customary practice. The analysis does not end there. It be-
comes more substantive. Such analysis looks beyond the procedural steps
and examines whether the purchaser decided correctly to stop at a par-
ticular step.
At the substantive stage of analysis, the statutory definition of the
phrase "no reason to know" becomes significant. According to the Act:
The court shall take into account any specialized knowledge
or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of
the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontami-
nated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable infor-
mation about the property, the obviousness of the presence or
likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability
to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.'
7
1
These factors all have a ring of negligence to them. They are all based
on information obtained in the first or second phase of a pre-acquisition
environmental assessment. They are not unlike the considerations that
are routinely made to determine whether a landowner is negligent for
failure to protect a visitor to his property from physical injury. They lend
themselves to a case-by-case determination under a standard of reason-
ableness.
169 Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988).
170 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 55-56 (1985).
171 CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986).
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These factors could also very easily be interpreted as imposing a rea-
sonable person standard for appropriate inquiry. Moreover, customary
practice is also a means of establishing reasonable behavior.172 Under a
reasonable person standard, a prospective purchaser would have a duty
to initiate a phased environmental site assessment. Whether the pur-
chaser would have a duty to proceed to a next higher assessment phase
would be judged on the basis of whether a reasonable person would pro-
ceed.
Which reasonable person standard should apply? Prosser notes that a
person of superior knowledge will be held accountable for that knowl-
edge. 173 The Act requires that "the court shall take into account any
specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant. '174 And
as noted earlier, commercial transactions command a higher standard
than do residential transactions. 7 5 Therefore, an appropriate reasonable
person would have the same requisite knowledge as the defendant and
be involved in the same type of transaction.
A negligence standard for appropriate inquiry of course runs counter
to the strict liability nature of CERCLA. But so does any exception,
including the general third party defense and the more specific innocent
purchaser defense. However, the turnabout is not complete. The innocent
purchaser defense is still an affirmative defense. The purchaser must
prove that a prior owner solely caused the release and that the purchaser
did not exacerbate the hazard. He must also prove that he followed cus-
tomary procedures for an environmental site assessment prior to pur-
chase. If a purchaser proves these elements, the burden would then shift
to the government to prove that the purchaser was negligent in inter-
preting the site assessment.
The development of the law suggested here follows judicial decisions
and statutory language. No change in the Act is required. Recently, how-
ever, Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) introduced a bill to amend CERCLA along
the lines suggested here. The bill intends to clarify the meaning of ap-
propriate inquiry. 176 The completion of a prescribed assessment procedure
172 "[Elvidence of the usual and customary conduct" raises an inference "that
the actor is conforming to the community's idea of reasonable behavior." Unless
something in the "evidence or in common experience ... lead[s] to a contrary
conclusion, this inference may be so strong that it calls for a directed verdict on
the issue of negligence." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON ToRTs, 193-94 (5th ed. 1984).
173 Id. at 185.
- CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (Supp. 1986).
175 H.R. CONF REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986). See supra note
131.




would create a rebuttable presumption of an appropriate inquiry.177 How-
ever, this bill would apply only to commercial real estate purchases.
178
The bill adopts the phased-in approach to environmental assessment.
A purchaser must conduct historical research into previous ownership
and uses, a comprehensive review of government records and a surface
site investigation of the property, including historical aerial photographs,
if available. The bill would not require sampling unless the prior research
reveals a contaminant release or threat of release.'
7 9
The bill goes beyond the suggestions here and actually modifies the
present Act. The Act now requires that an innocent purchaser have no
reason to know of any disposal of a hazardous substance. Rep. Weldon's
bill would allow an innocent purchaser to know of a disposal as long as
he had no reason to know that there was a release or threat of release of
the hazardous substance.
C. What to Do Until the Law is Settled
1. The Decision to Buy
All prospective purchasers are advised to conduct some inquiry into
evidence of an earlier disposal of any hazardous substance. For a pur-
chaser of residential property, the inquiry may be no more than an ex-
amination of property records to ascertain whether the property was used
by a business or manufacturer that might have disposed of a hazardous
substance. In addition, the purchaser should inspect the property for
obvious signs of waste disposal. Most importantly, the purchaser must
follow up on any evidence of disposal.
For a purchaser of commercial property the standards of inquiry are
greater than for residential purchases. The purchaser should have a
professional search the records of title and government records for evi-
dence of a possible disposal of any hazardous substance. The search ma-
terials should include historical records of aerial photographs not only
for hazardous substances that may be on the surface, but also for signs
of activity that are indicia of hazardous substance disposal. Only if these
initial steps indicate the possibility of a disposal should soil sampling be
necessary. Not all land purchases, not even all commercial land pur-
chases, require a full and complete environmental assessment. Rather,
the extent of the assessment should be judged on a standard of reason-
ableness appropriate to the circumstances.
11 See 135 CONG. REC. E2367, 2367 (extension of remarks by Rep. Weldon, R-
Pa., Jun. 28, 1989).
178 See Bill to Clarify 'Appropriate Inquiry' for Innocent Land Owner Defense
Offered, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 47 (Jul. 10, 1989).
179 135 CONG. REC. at 2368.
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Lenders are likely to insist on some kind of assessment. Normally,
lenders are conservative and are likely to drop out at the first sign of
trouble. Therefore, if a lender requires an environmental site assessment,
that assessment should suffice for appropriate inquiry, especially for a
residential purchaser. However, a holder of a security interest has im-
munity that a purchaser does not have. If a commercial purchaser is
sound financially, a lender may extend credit even though the purchaser
may have some finite risk of liability. These commercial purchasers are
well advised to make their own independent evaluations.
If a reasonable analysis indicates that some hazardous substances have
indeed been disposed of on the property, the purchaser may still buy the
property even though the purchase will eliminate the innocent purchaser
defense. Knowledge of a disposal deprives the purchaser of the defense,
but the disposal itself does not bring liability. Liability results from a
release of the hazardous substances. The purchaser should therefore an-
alyze the probability of a release and the cost of a cleanup if a release
does occur. The product of these two factors equals a fair discount on the
property.
2. Litigation After a Hazardous Release
An innocent purchaser can and should avoid litigation. The Act pro-
vides, and the government has indicated, a receptiveness to de minimis
settlements. In this forum an innocent purchaser sets forth the innocent
purchaser defense. If the defense is good, settlement is quick and the
purchaser need only promise access and cooperation with the response
efforts. He would have to cooperate anyway to establish the due care
requirement of the affirmative defense. If the defense is questionable, the
government may still settle to reduce its litigation costs. But now the
government will require a minimal cash-out contribution. Even a truly
innocent purchaser will gladly accept this compromise and save litigation
costs. Most importantly, in a lost suit against the government, liability
is joint and several and need not be proportional to the injury caused. An
innocent purchaser would have to initiate contribution suits after the
suit by the government and incur further litigation costs. Even if the
innocent purchaser prevails through all this litigation, his property rights
and business credit will have been hampered by the uncertain liability
during the protracted litigation.
If the government is not receptive to a de minimis settlement, an in-
nocent purchaser may seek a declaratory judgment for contribution
against other responsible persons. However, note that de minimis settle-
ments are available not just to innocent purchasers. The government will
also settle with any responsible person whose liability is small relative
to total response costs. Therefore, those with whom the government will
refuse to settle are likely not to be innocent purchasers. Nonetheless, a
somewhat innocent purchaser can seek declaratory relief that will limit




The only time an innocent purchaser should have to defend a govern-
ment response action is when all or most of the other responsible persons
are judgment proof. Such an event is not unlikely. Superfund liability
can easily bankrupt responsible persons. The government would certainly
seek a deep pocket to reimburse the Superfund. SARA nonetheless au-
thorizes a de minimis settlement even though the Superfund would not
be reimbursed. However, the purchaser may find it difficult to overrule
the government's failure to settle. Government authority to settle is dis-
cretionary.18 0 In order to overcome an administrative act of discretion,
one must prove that the agency was "arbitrary and capricious or otherwise
not in accordance with the law."1 " Such a standard of proof is difficult to
maintain.
DAVID W. MARCZELY
1-o CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (Supp. 1986).
i8, CERCLA § 113()(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986). See also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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